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LABOR UNIONS FOR PRISON INMATES: AN ANALYSIS OF
A RECENT PROPOSAL FOR THE ORGANIZATION
OF INMATE LABOR
INTRODUCTION
The way to make a bomb is to build a strong perimeter and
generate pressure inside. Similarly, riots occur in prisons where
oppressive pressures and demands are generated in the presence of
strong custodial containment.'
Present day correctional facilities are highly conducive to in-
ternal disorder. Among the factors that have led to this condition
are
overcrowding, poor administration, insufficient financial support,
political interference, lack of professional leadership, inefficient or
non-existent treatment programs, disparities in sentencing, poor
and unjust parole policies, enforced idleness of prisoners, obsolete
physical plant, and a small group of hard-core and intractable
prisoners.2
Recently, considerable attention has been given to methods of re-
ducing tensions within correctional facilities in order to minimize
the likelihood of the recurrence of Attica-like disasters.3 One pro-
posal is to allow inmates to form and participate in labor unions
for the purpose of bargaining with prison administrators on work-
related issues.4 At first glance this suggestion appears to be prepos-
1. Fox, Why Prisoners Riot, 35 FED. PROB. 9, 10 (March 1971) [hereinafter cited as Fox].
2. Id. at 9.
3. See e.g., Fox, supra note 1; Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39
GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 175 (1970).
4. See Bass, Correcting the Correctional System: A Responsibility of the Legal Pro-
fession, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE RaV. 125, 149 (1971). See also the "Bill of Rights," note 60, infra;
Anvil, July 1971, at 2 (the newspaper of the California Prisoners Union); N.Y. Times, Feb 8,
1972, at 1, col. 2. An earlier discussion of the organization of inmate labor is found in
Lopez-Rey, Some Considerations on the Character and Organization of Prison Labour, 49
J. CRiM. C.L. & P.S. 10 (1958). For a definition of "union" and "labor union," see letter of
Sept. 3, 1971 to Mr. Jovalis McNelley #16013, Drawer B, Stormville, New York 12582 from
a representative of the New York Department of Labor. This letter, exhibit "A" in Smoake
v. Zelker, Civil No. 71-4095 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), describes a union as follows:
In a broad sense it symbolizes an organization composed of a body of persons
united in the pursuit of a common cause or enterprise....
Generally, a labor union is a combination of wage earners organized for their
mutual betterment, protection and advancement.
Although this comment deals primarily with the "right" to form labor unions, con-
sideration should be given to the extension of the application of labor union conflict
resolution devices to other areas of activity. The success of the application of collective
bargaining to community conflict resolution is noted in Kheel, Collective Bargaining and
Community Disputes, 92 Mo. LAB. RaV. 3 (1969). See note 72, infra.
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terous and entirely unrealistic, yet a closer examination indicates
that there may be a certain amount of viability to the proposition.
The trend toward the unionization of inmates has already been
noted in certain European countries.5 Inmates may have a con-
stitutionally protected right to participate in some form of labor
organization,6 and if this right can be exercised to a limited extent
without creating serious threats to the security or the order of the
institution, an absolute ban on such limited exercise may amount
to an unconstitutional deprivation.7 Additionally, modem devel-
opments in certain federal and state prisons indicate that forms of
inmate self-government or inmate participation in prison govern-
ment can be desirable and useful methods of dealing with many of
the problems that do not lend themselves to adequate reform by
legislative or judicial bodies." Finally, unionization may contrib-
ute to the rehabilitation of the inmate.0
5. See Bass, supra note 4; Fox, supra note 1, at 13.
6. See notes 10, 11, infra.
7. See notes 24-50, infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 67-71, infra and accompanying text. For examples of the kinds of reforms
that courts and legislatures have demanded, see Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674
(N.D. Cal. 1966). Some courts have taken the position that
when . . . the responsible prison authorities . . . have abandoned elemental con-
cepts of decency by permitting conditions to prevail of a shocking and debased
nature, then the courts must intervene-and intervene promptly-to restore the
primal rules of a civilized community in accord with the mandates of the Con.
stitution of the United States.
Id. at 680. Jordan involved the use of "strip" or "quiet" cells for the punishment of in.
mates. The court required that such cells be provided with the "basic requirements
essential to life." Id. at 683.
For a view of some of the legislative "reforms" that have been instituted, see Crawford,
Prisoners' Rights-A Prosecutors View, 16 Viru. L. REv. 1055 (1971):
In 1935 the legislature mandated that Pennsylvania construct a jail system so
that 'every person committed ... may be confined separately and apart from every
other person committed thereto.' That strikes me as a demand that we not put ...
two to a cell.
Id. at 1067. An example of an improvement in New York State is seen in the revised Cor-
rection Law section 171 which abolishes the "hard labor" requirement. N.Y. Coagmc. LAW
§ 171 (McKinney Supp. 1971-72).
In Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), the Second Circuit indicated
that certain "deplorable" prison conditions could not be adequately remedied by the court:
[W]e disclaim any intent by this decision to condone, ignore, or discount the de-
plorable and counter-productive conditions of many of this country's jails and
prisons .... We do not doubt the magnitude of the task ahead before our cor-
rectional systems become acceptable and effective from a correctional, social and
humane viewpoint, but the proper tools for the job do not lie with a remote
federal court. The sensitivity to local nuance, opportunity for daily perseverence,
and the human and monetary resources lie rather with legislators, executives, and
citizens in their communities.
For examples of the types of problems which are allowed to persist, see Quick v.
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I. THE RIGHT TO UNIONIZE: DOES IT
EXIST FOR PRISON INMATES?
In theory, "a prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary
citizen except those expressly or by necessary implication, taken
from him by law." 10 Consequently, the presence or absence of the
"right" to unionize turns on both the possession of this right by
the ordinary citizen and the constitutional, statutory and practical
considerations which might specifically or by necessary implica-
tion withdraw this right from the inmate. The right of the ordi-
nary citizen to form and participate in labor unions has been well
established.1 However, there is some question as to whether this
Tompkins, 425 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1970) (inmate's order of goods from the canteen was not
delivered, his money was not refunded, and he was told that it was just too bad); Granville
v. Hunt, 411 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1969) (inmate complained that he was not fit to do heavy
manual labor); Ralls v. Waffe, 321 F. Supp. 867 (D. Neb. 1971) (refusing to allow an inmate
to shade his cell light was not a denial of a federally protected right); Argentine v. Mc-
Ginnis, 311 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (confiscation of personal property by guards and
reclassification of inmate to a lower paying prison job). See also Singer, Prison Conditions:
An Unconstitutional Roadblock to Rehabilitation, 20 CATuOLIC U.L. REv. 365, 372-86
(1971): "The typical prison .. .has changed relatively little from the institutions of 150
years earlier." Id. at 372. Professor Singer reviews the physical conditions of prisons,
brutality in prisons and psychological conditions of prison life. Id. at 372-86.
9. See notes 96-104, infra and accompanying text.
10. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 887
(1945).
In the past inmates have brought actions to end the unconstitutional deprivation of
certain fundamental rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Actions brought under the Act have involved religious freedoms (e.g., Gittlemacker v.
Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970)), access to mails and access to courts (e.g., Sostre v. Rocke-
feller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)), allegations of cruel and unusual punishment (e.g.,
Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970)), etc.
11. The first amendment prohibits Congress from "abridging the freedom of speech
...or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances." The fourteenth amendment prohibits states from enforcing "any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), made it clear that "[t]he right to discuss and inform
people concerning the advantages and disadvantages of unions and joining them is pro-
tected not only as part of free speech but as part of free assembly." Id. at 532. States may
regulate the activity of a labor union, but may not "trespass upon the domains set apart
for free speech and free assembly." Id. The right to form a labor union and to participate
in the union is protected against government interference by the first and fourteenth
amendments. American Fed'n of State, County & Municipal Emp. v. Woodward, 406 F.2d
137 (8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948).
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act guarantees to all workers the right to
organize freely for collective bargaining purposes. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1965). Clearly this sec-
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right has been specifically or impliedly withdrawn from inmates.
Although New York law does not specifically withdraw the
unionization right from inmates, 12 the current posture of the De-
partment of Correctional Services is not favorable to inmate un-
ions. According to a departmental spokesman:
[T]he relationship of the inmates to the Department of Correc-
tional Services is not that of an employer-employee....
The Department of Correctional Services will not permit nor
recognize any inmate labor organization within the Department.
Such labor organization is contrary to the best interests of the De-
partment and the general welfare of the inmate population.13
tion contemplates the right to join a union. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act declares employer
interference, restraint or coercion of employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights to be
unlawful. Id. § 158(a)(1). Section 202 of the N.Y. Civil Service Law (McKinney Supp. 1971-
72) gives public employees the right to unionize.
12. See motion for summary judgment in the case of Smoake v. Zelker, Civil No.
71-4095 at 5 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 26, 1971), where it is noted that New York law does not
specifically bar inmate unions. See also N.Y. Civ. SRav. LAw § 200 et seq. (McKinney 1959);
N.Y. CoRm . LAw § 170 et seq. (McKinney 1968).
13. Letter of Oct. 8, 1971 to Lawrence D. Ross, Esq., Legal Aid Society, Criminal
Appeals Bureau, 119 Fifth Ave., N.Y., N.Y. 10003 by a representative of the New York
Department of Correctional Services. This letter was offered in evidence in the case of
Smoake v. Zelker, Civil No. 71-4095 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 26, 1971). See also Comment, Beyond the
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72
YALE L.J. 506, 587 (1968): "Milt is clear that the right to assemble and to petition for a
redress of grievances is not permitted in prison."
On February 7, 1972, representatives of the inmates of Greenhaven Prison in Stormville,
New York announced the formation of the Prisoners Labor Union at Greenhaven. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 2. Commenting on this announcement, New York State
Corrections Commissioner Russell G. Oswald said:
In no manner or way have we given permission to start such a union. This
could become a complex legal problem and I don't want to go any further since
this may end up in the courts.
Buffalo Evening News, Feb. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
To determine the sentiments of prison administrators with respect to labor unions and
other forms of inmate bargaining, the author conducted a survey of state corrections de-
partments. On February 8, 1972 a copy of the following questionnaire was mailed to the
correctional services department of each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia:
Gentlemen,
This questionnaire is part of a nation-wide survey to gather information for a
Law Review comment to be published in No. 3 of volume 21 of the Buffalo Law
Review. The comment explores the arguments for and against the formation of
inmate labor unions. Your cooperation in responding to the following questions
will prove invaluable to the successful completion of this project....
1) Would you oppose the formation of inmate YES NO
labor unions to bargain with administrators concern-
ing prison working conditions?
2) If a labor union could be structured so that YES NO
threats to security or order within the institution could
be brought below current levels, would you oppose its
formation?
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3) Are you opposed to all forms of "bargaining" YES NO
between inmates and administrators?
4) If 3 was answered "NO," what type(s) of bar-
gaining would you favor?
5) Feel free to make any additional comments.
Despite the tendency to discard such surveys, and the severe time limitation which required
an immediate response, representatives of 24 states completed and returned the question-
naire. One state expressed unwillingness to comment on the unionization of inmates. An-
other did not answer questions one and two. Judging from the nature of the replies, some
administrators have given careful attention to the unionization proposal. This may have
been responsible for the readiness of some departments to respond. However, the unusual
nature of the subject matter of the questions may have been responsible for the refusal of
many administrators to respond: some may have viewed the questions as outrageous, ridic-
ulous and unworthy of response, while others may have believed that the issue was too
"hot" to handle at the time.
The responses to the first three questions were as follows:
1) Would you oppose the formation of inmate labor unions YES NO
to bargain with administrators concerning prison working con- 20 3
ditions?
2) If a labor union could be structured so that threats to YES NO
security and order within the institution could be brought below 15 8
current levels, would you oppose its formation?
3) Are you opposed to all forms of "bargaining" between YES NO
inmates and administrators? 10 14
Clearly administrators are not in favor of the "unionization" of inmates. However, approval
increases as security threats decrease, and many administrators do not oppose all forms of
inmate bargaining.
The concerns of administrators were evidenced by their responses to questions four and
five. While some indicated that normal industrial unions or unions to bargain about non-
labor issues would be preferable to inmate labor unions, others were opposed to all types
of unionization. One respondent to the questionnaire stated that
[b]argaining is give and take for both sides. With inmates its all take until they
say I take your life.
This was a rather extreme statement, but the underlying concern for security should be rec-
ognized as a practical difficulty which must be faced. Other administrators fear that abuses
will follow the granting of power to inmates. Still others fear staff problems and changes in
the nature of the institution as a result of the increased managerial burden of unions. A
final group indicate that bargaining is counterproductive to the rehabilitation of inmates
and to the mutual honesty and freedom of communication which is most desirable in a
prison environment. This group contends that unions intensify the adversary features of
the prison environment, and that good administration rather than "bargaining" is the key
to success in eliminating the problems of prison life.
It is difficult to evaluate the responses which were received. While they indicate an
unwillingness to accept unions at the present time, they also tend to support the belief that
some form of "bargaining" would be acceptable in many institutions. Although a few ad-
ministrators are bitterly opposed to all forms of inmate collective bargaining, others are
extremely receptive. As security problems are diminished, acceptability increases. This may
imply that administrators would be willing to accept unions if they could be structured so
as to minimize the undesirable consequences which many believe are inevitable. The
abuses rather than the bargaining are the cause of the resistance. Although our results are
inconclusive, they indicate the need for an intensive investigation of the particular objec-
tions of corrections officials in order to determine the legitimate administrative require-
ments which must be met by any workable, viable inmate organizational effort. This study
will hereinafter be referred to as Survey.
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This statement is, no doubt, based on the belief that the rights of
"workers" do not belong to prison inmates 14 because they are not
"employees" 15 or have forfeited their rights as employees. How-
ever, if the New York Public Employees' Fair Employment Act
definition of employee were used, the inmate would apparently be
a member of the employee class; 1 he is "employed" by the Depart-
ment of Correctional Services 17 and his labor or products may be
sold by the Department to the state, political divisions thereof or
public institutions at prices "as near the usual market price for
such labor and supplies as possible." 18 The inmate, in turn, "may
receive compensation for work performed during his imprison-
ment." 10 Payments are to be according to "graded wage sched-
ules . . . based upon . . . the value of work performed. ' 20
Inmates may dispose of money received only upon the receipt of
approval from the commissioner. 21 With the exception of this last
consideration, it would seem that inmate "employees" resemble
public employees in most work-related aspects.
Assuming that the inmate worker is a "public employee"
14. See generally Lopez-Rey, supra note 4.
15. "Employees" in this context refers to members of the national labor force. See id.
16. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAw § 201(7) (McKinney 1959):
The term "public employee" means any person holding a position by appoint-
ment or employment in the service of a public employer.
Public employer is defined as follows:
The term "government" or "public employer" means (i) the state of New
York . . .or (vi) any other public corporation, agency or instrumentality or unit
of government which exercises governmental powers under the laws of the state.
Section 202 gives public employees the right to unionize. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 202 (Mc-
kinney Supp. 1971-72).
The National Labor Relations Act is not applicable to inmate "employees" because tie
NLRA definition of "employee" specifically excludes all individuals who are not employed
by "employers" from the protection of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1965). "Employer" as
defined by the Act does not include "any State or political subdivision thereof . . " Id.
§ 152(2).
See Hudgins v. Hart, 323 F. Supp. 898, 899 (E.D. La. 1971), which indicates that al-
though inmates are not entitled to the protection of the Fair Labor Standards Act, they are
employees of the state.
17. N.Y. CoRmuc. LAw § 171 (McKinney Supp. 1971-72) provides as follows:
The commissioner of correction and the superintendents and officials of all
penitentiaries in the state may cause inmates ... who are physically capable
thereof, to be employed, for not to exceed eight hours of each day, other than Sun-
days and public holidays, but such labor shall be either for the production of sup-
plies for said institution, or for the state, or any political divisions thereof, ...or
for the purposes of industrial training and instruction.
18. Id. § 186.
19. Id. § 187.
20. Id.
21. Id. § 189.
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within the definition of the Public Employees' Fair Employment
Act, it is necessary to determine whether the fact that he is also an
inmate strips him of the normal unionization rights of the public
worker. Although "[a]n individual once validly convicted and
placed under Department of Correction jurisdiction is not to be
divested of all rights and unilaterally abandoned by the remainder
of society," 22 to "secure custody of prisoners and to assure order-
liness within [correctional] institutions, it [is] . . .necessary to
subject prisoners' behavior to a number of controls and regula-
tions." 23 The determination of whether institutionalization nec-
essarily removes the unionization right from the inmate depends
on his possession of that right and the extent to which its exercise
must be limited to maintain security and order within the institu-
tion.
The right to unionize is itself a composite of the more funda-
mental freedoms of speech, press, peaceable assembly and petition
for redress of grievances. 24 Inmates possess some of these rights, 5
and cases dealing with such inmate liberties as freedom to receive
and read literature 26 and freedom of religion 27 indicate that the
rights afforded by the first amendment to every American are to
be vigorously protected and may be restricted within the correc-
tional facility only if a "compelling state interest centering about
prison security, or a clear and present danger of breach of prison
discipline, or [the threat of] some substantial interference with
22. People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 174 N.E.2d 725, 726, 215
N.Y.S.2d 44, 45-46 (1961).
23. Note, The Problems of Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights, 53 IowA L.
Rv. 671 (1967). In Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948), the Supreme Court noted
that:
Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges and rights, a reaction justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system.
The Connecticut District Court came to a similar conclusion in Berrigan v. Norton, 322
F. Supp. 46, 51 (D. Conn. 1971):
These plaintiffs must face the fact that they have temporarily forfeited many of
the rights associated with free men during their period of commitment.
24. See discussion in supra note 11.
25. Cases which have recognized this include Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964);
Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1964); Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp.
901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215
N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961).
26. Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
27. Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233
(2d Cir. 1961).
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orderly institutional administration" 28 exists. If this standard is
applicable to the first amendment freedoms which represent the
component parts of the right to unionize, then these same consid-
erations would be applicable to a determination of the extent to
which the Constitution would protect the right of inmates to form
and participate in labor unions. The maintenance of security
within the institution has traditionally been a sufficiently compel-
ling state interest to warrant the restriction of civil liberties.2 Yet
even where this interest has been found to exist, the limits of per-
missable regulation have been narrowly construed by commenta-
tors s' and courts "- who believe that the test requires that the
limitation selected be the least restrictive way of meeting the in-
terest 32 of the state. The "dear and present danger" which would
justify the restriction of first amendment freedoms exists only if
the words or conduct in question are "directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and [are] likely to incite or pro-
duce such action." 83 "Substantial interference with orderly prison
administration" is not demonstrated by a showing of mere incon-
venience to administrators.34 To determine the impact of these
considerations on the ability of inmates to unionize, it is neces-
sary to determine the extent to which they allow prison adminis-
trators to restrict the more basic freedoms which comprise the
unionization right.
Security and order arguments have enabled prison adminis-
trators to severely curtail the basic freedoms of speech and assem-
bly.35 Courts have noted that "although the rights of free speech
28. Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also
Rabinowitz, The Expansion of Prisoner's Rights, 16 VILL. L. REv. 1047 (1971):
[P]risoners live under our Constitution, and are entitled to all of the rights en-
joyed by anyone else, subject only to such modification as is necessary because of
their status.
29. See Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
30. See Rabinowitz, supra note 28; 84 HARV. L. REv. 1727, 1731 (1971):
[iThe ultimate validity of any condition should depend not only on whether it
contributes significantly towards furthering such state interests, but also on whether
it does this without curbing a needlessly large amount of speech.
31. Barnett v. Rogers, 409 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp.
127, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
32. See Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
33. Bandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
34. See Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968) where the "administrative
convenience" argument was insufficient to justify the stringent limitations imposed on the
right of inmates to receive periodicals and newspapers.
35. See Smoake v. Zelker, Civil No. 71-4095 ($.D.N.Y., Oct. 26, 1971), where an inmate
was alleging the deprivation of first amendment freedoms by correctional officers who disci-
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and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature abso-
lute. Their exercise is subject to restriction . 3.8.. " Since these
restrictions are applicable to the ordinary citizen, those who are
confined must suffer at least this same restraint.3 7 In Price v.
Johnson 38 the Supreme Court held that the rights of inmates may
be curtailed even more than the rights of those who are not con-
finedV9 This additional restraint is required if security and order
within the institution are to be maintained. An indication of the
extent to which the rights of inmates may be curtailed or with-
drawn was provided in Roberts v. Pepersack,40 which dealt with
attempts by an inmate to organize a collective protest against
prison conditions. The district court 41 held that the prisoner
has no judicially enforceable right to advocate open defiance of
authority within the prison walls .... Supreme Court statements
to the effect that there is no absolute right to freedom of speech
means [sic) that attempts to speak in a milieu where such speech
may incite an insurrection against the authorities must be tem-
pered. Prison authorities cannot be expected to permit such condi-
tions in the name of free speech. In a prison environment, where
the climate tends to be more volatile than on the streets, strong
restraints and heavy penalties are in order.42
A similar result was reached in Fulwood v. Clemmer,3 where the
court upheld the propriety of curtailing a religious speech which
tended to incite a breach of the peace, even though no breach of
the peace actually occurred.4 The conclusion flowing from these
cases is that the nature of the prison situation creates an ex-
tremely volatile atmosphere, and prison authorities cannot be ex-
pected to allow any speech, assembly or activity which might tend
plined him for making a peaceful speech about unionization to a group of from 80 to 50
inmates. See also Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusual
to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 587 (1963).
86. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 878 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Roberts
v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 428 (D. Md. 1966).
87. Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415,428 (D. Md. 1966).
88. 834 U.S. 266 (1948).
89. Id. at 285.
40. 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966).
41. District Court of Maryland.
42. 256 F. Supp. at 429-80.
48. 206 F. Supp. 870 (D.D.C. 1962).
44. Id. The extremely "volatile" nature of the situation is important to describe. The
speech in question was made on a recreation field during a baseball game. Five or six guards
and six or seven hundred inmates were on the field. The speaker "made references to the
white race as liars, thieves and murderers." Id. at 877.
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to incite an insurrection within the institution. If the unionization
of inmates would have this effect, it could be banned. That union-
ization would inevitably lead to this result, however, is not clear.
It is possible that a labor organization would reduce the height-
ened tensions and frustrations within the institution by providing
inmates with a legitimate channel for the communication and re-
dress of grievances and by structuring and legitimizing the in-
formal organization which already exists within most institutions.
In the general labor force, employer acceptance of and cooperation
with labor organization has resulted in a reduction of union mili-
tancy and the stabilization of industrial relations.5 If the forma-
tion of unions within correctional facilities would have this effect,
it is possible that administrators would have legal and social
responsibility to allow unionization.
At the present time it is clear that inmates do not have an ad-
ministratively, leglislatively or judicially recognized right to union-
ize.41 Inmates have recently fought courtroom battles to secure
such basics as toilet paper and other essentials in "strip" cells, 7
freedom from beatings and constant harassment,48 freedom to pro-
fess unconventional religious beliefs,4 9 etc. The necessities of in-
stitutional life required the imposition of certain limitations on
the underlying constitutional rights which were involved in each
of these cases. Yet although these constitutionally protected rights
had never been completely withdrawn from inmates, litigation was
necessary to bring these theoretically retained rights into the realm
of reality. Current litigation has indicated that all inmate activity
which may tend to incite disorder within the prison may be cur-
tailed or prohibited.8 0 An inmate labor union would be allowed
45. See R. LEsMER, As UNIONS MATURE 29-80 (1958):
[U]nions have lost some of the militancy and rambunctiousness that charac-
terized them before World War II. During the 1940's and 1950's they became more
disciplined and businesslike.
[C]ontributing factors . . . have been . . . greater employer acceptance and
cooperation with labor organizations, [and] the increase in workers' living standards
under full employment ....
Union militancy is, of course, one reaction to employer hostility and threats to
the union's existence.
46. See discussion in supra note 85.
47. See Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
48. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Landman v. Royster, 833
F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
49. See Cruz v. Beto, 329 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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only if it could be structured so as to minimize or avoid any tend-
ency to incite disorder. As with the right to a humane environ-
ment, the right to personal security, and the right to exercise
religious beliefs, a right to unionize theoretically exists within these
guidelines; but if this right is to become reality, administrators,
legislatures and courts must be convinced that inmate unionization
can be viable even within the necessarily narrow borders which
exist.
II. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
EXERCISE OF THE LIMITED UNIONIZATION RIGHT
There are many groups in our society who, because of their
status, are not entitled to the protection of every single provision
of our Constitution. We all understand this and make necessary
adjustments. [T]he military ... [c]hildren ... people who are
mentally ill . . . and . . . perhaps . . . students do not have pro-
tection of all the provisions of the Constitution. But the Constitu-
tion gives all of these people its protection, to the greatest extent
possible (see, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)), and the same
rule should apply to prisoners.51
Inmates may have the right to unionize, but the nature of the cor-
rectional facility necessitates the substantial limitation of that
right.152 Thus, as in the case of other public employees, 53 the right
to strike " might be denied: unresolved disputes could be sub-
mitted to binding arbitration. In the case of public employees, the
paramount state interest being protected is the need to shield the
general public from the serious inconvenience and possible threat
to safety which would accompany a strike. 5 Similarly, the prohi-
bition of strikes by inmates would be justified by considerations of
safety and order, both within and without the institution. Addi-
tional limitations might be imposed upon the size of the audience
to a union speech or gathering,56 or upon the location or time of
51. Rabinowitz, supra note 28, at 1048.
52. Limitations may be imposed to maintain security and order, to further the re-
habilitative goal, etc. See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
53. See N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 200 et seq. (McKinney 1959).
54. Id. § 210: "No public employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike,
and no public employee or employee organization shall cause, institgate, encourage, or con-
done a strike."
55. See Civil Serv. Emp. Ass'n v. Helsby, 31 App. Div. 2d 325, 297 N.Y.S.2d 813 (3d
Dep't 1969).
56. See Rabinowitz, supra note 28, at 1049: "I do not suppose that mass meetings in
prisons are practicable."
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such a gathering. It is possible that in some institutions the limita-
tions would necessarily be so severe as to preclude the exercise of
all forms of unionization. Administrators could not be expected
to permit any form of activity which would disrupt the tense equi-
librium which exists in some of the more volatile prisons. However,
this should be the exception rather than the general rule. Courts
have recognized that while
there are risks in every phase of human life . .. [the security in-
terest of the state] can never justify treatment and procedures in
prison confinement proven violative of human decency and consti-
tutional rights. 57
A minimal risk to security, which can be met by the imposition of
restrictions which do not require the prohibition of all forms of
the constitutionally protected right, is not sufficient to warrant
an absolute ban on all exercises of the right. The least restrictive
limitation is the most that may be imposed."8
To understand the extent to which inmates might expect to
organize within the confines of the present correctional system, it
is important to consider some of the existing forms of inmate or-
ganization or inmate bargaining which, in a sense, are "precedent"
for the unionization concept. Similarly, it is important to consider
some of the apprehensions of prison administrators who have given
considerable thought to the consequences which have been indi-
cated by past organization attempts.
A. Existing Forms of Inmate Bargaining: Precedent For Inmate
Labor Unions?
At the present time two inmate "unions" exist within the
United States.59 Although prison administrators have not recog-
nized these organizations as bargaining agents for their inmate
members, it is important to briefly review their major features
because these efforts represent the first attempts to apply concepts
of full unionization to inmate labor.
The United Prisoners Union was formed in California for
the purpose of organizing inmates and ex-convicts into a unit to
57. Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
58. See text supra note 32.
59. The United Prisoners Union, also known as the California Prisoners Union, 4718
Melrose Ave., Los Angeles, Calif. 90004 [hereinafter referred to as U.P.U.]; Prisoners Labor
Union at Green Haven, Green Haven Prison, Stormville, N.Y. 12582.
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demand the redress of various grievances.60 The literature of this
organization suggests that some of its aims transcend the immedi-
ate problems of prison inmates and encompass the goals of a great
many of the groups which together comprise the "oppressed"
class."' However, some of the goals seem to parallel the aims of
the normal employee union: Article III section (2) of the "Bill of
Rights" calls for the establishment of a minimum wage, disability
compensation, vacation from work with pay, pension plans, retire-
ment benefits and life insurance.
The formation of the Prisoners Labor Union at Green Haven
was announced by representatives of the inmates of Green Haven
Prison in Stormville, New York on February 7, 1972.62 At the re-
quest of union leaders, the executive committee of District 65 of
the Distributive Workers of America agreed to accept the group
as an affiliate.13 The inmates consider themselves to be "public
employees"-entitled to bargain collectively with administrators
under the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act . 4 Immediate
bargaining concerning wages, hours and working conditions is
sought: but long range goals include the economic, political, social
and cultural uplift of inmates.
The U.P.U. and the Prisoners Labor Union at Green Haven
represent the extreme in inmate democracy and self-determina-
tion, and contrast sharply with the present ban on the use of any
type of concerted action to redress inmate grievances. However,
some realistic form of unionization can be found within these polar
extremes.
The pattern could be taken from student government func-
tioning under a university administration. It could be taken from
60. See U.P.U., The Bill of Rights of the Convicted Class (1971) [hereinafter cited as
the "Bill of Rights"].
61. Id. The scope of the U.P.U. concerns include sex and race discrimination (Article
IV) and the Vietnam war (Article IX). Some of the goals of the U.P.U. appear to be seeking
rights beyond those constitutionally guaranteed. Article III section (3) of the "Bill of Rights"
of the U.P.U. would prohibit the imposition of forced labor on prisoners. 'However, the
thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution allows for such an imposition as
punishment for a crime:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted shall exist within the United
States.
See also Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
62. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
63. Id. Unlike the U.P.U., the Prisoners Labor Union at Green Haven has elected to
affiliate with an "outside," established union.
64. Id. at 28. See also N.Y. Civ. Smv. LAw § 200 et seq. (McKinney 1959).
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a civilian government operating under military occupation by the
victors after a war, such as those civilian governments in Japan or
Germany after W. W. II. The pattern in the Federal Bureau of
Prisons and some other systems has been the inmate council, where
elected inmates discuss problems and appropriate policies with the
prison administration, making recommendations and suggestions.
A suggestion box system for inmates might be instituted if other
approaches appear to be too innovative.65
One or more of these suggested forms of "organization" might
be acceptable at the present time. The criteria for selecting the
precise form should be the minimization of security risks and the
maximization of the organizational rights of the inmates.
Recent developments indicate that collective bargaining be-
tween inmates and administrators can be an extremely effective
method of correcting institutional problems and averting disor-
ders. Morris v. Travisono 10 involved extended negotiations be-
tween administrators and inmates over certain rules, practices and
conditions of life at the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institu.
tion. The district court judge acted as an arbitrator in the dispute
and approved an agreement which the parties themselves had ne-
gotiated. The court retained jurisdiction over the dispute for an
eighteen month period subsequent to entry of the decision to en-
sure the effectiveness of the agreement.6T Similarly, the Center for
Correctional Justice 68 located in the District of Columbia has
been developing non-judicial methods of settling disputes and of
resolving grievances of offenders. Fact finding, negotiation, concili-
ation, mediation and arbitration 69 are employed.70 The pro-
cedure of the Center begins with independent fact finding to de-
termine the nature of a particular complaint. Grievances which
cannot be resolved through negotiation are dealt with by the var-
65. Fox, supra note 1, at 13.
66. 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
67. Id. at 861.
68. The Center for Correctional Justice is a private, non-profit, District of Columbia
corporation which is authorized by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections to
sponsor a unique and comprehensive legal services program in institutions and programs
under the Department's jurisdiction. The Center is located at 1616 H Street, Northwest,
Washington, D.C. 20006.
69. See Center for Correctional Justice, an outline of strategies published by the
Center for Correctional Justice at 4 [hereinafter cited to as Outline].
70. The Center is currently working with the Youth Services Division of the District
of Columbia Department of Corrections. The Division serves about 1,500 offenders between
the ages of 18 and 26. See Outline, supra note 69, at 4.
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ious conflict resolution techniques available to the Center. Litiga-
tion is a measure reserved as a last resort. As of November 6, 1971
the Center had addressed itself to a number of problems, and had
met with success in setting up negotiating procedures, reinstalling
vending machines in the visiting hall, extending. visiting hours,
improving medical care, etc.71 The Center has not been involved
in any labor disputes, but the success which the general labor
force has experienced in bargaining collectively with employers is
abundant evidence of the utility of this device in the labor field.72
In light of this, there may be reason to believe that the methods of
settlement which have been used to resolve disputes in other areas
of prison life would meet with success if they could be applied
to the area of labor relations.
The strategy of the Center is to gradually increase the privi-
leges granted to inmates as they show an increasing willingness to
accept greater responsibility. Thus, as the threat to security or
order is reduced the rights of the inmates are broadened. An agree-
ment reached concerning the placement and use of vending ma-
chines is an excellent example of the way the procedure operates.
Subject to preliminary conditions, inmates and administrators
agreed that:
4. For an initial sixty (60) day trial period to begin when the
machines arrive at the Youth Center, one additional officer will be
required to be stationed within the visiting hall. If the additional
officer is not available on a particular visitation day, the vending
machines will not be made available that day.
5. If, after the first thirty (30) days of the trial period, the ma-
chines were not made available in the visiting hall for at least one-
71. See Center For Correctional Justice, Second Quarterly Report 5 (Nov. 6, 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Report].
72. See Kheel, Collective Bargaining and Community Disputes, 92 Mo. IAB. RFv. 3
(1969), where the generally recognized success of collective bargaining in resolving labor
disputes is noted.
This system of collective bargaining works far better than most people realize,
producing agreements and stable relationships in more than 99 percent of all
negotiations.
Id.
In pointing to the unique applicability of collective bargaining to the resolution of labor
disputes, Mr. Kheel notes that:
Disputes over wages or other financial provisions of a collective bargaining
contract cannot be settled by resort to a ready legal standard. Not only is there no
legal basis for requiring . . . such adjustments, but their variety is so infinite as
to make imposition by law an impossibility.
Id.
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half ( ) of the scheduled visiting periods due to the unavailability
of an additional officer, for the remaining (30) days of the trial
period the machines will be placed within the visiting hall every
visiting day, whether or not an additional officer is available.
6. If after the 60-day trial period no serious problems arise with
respect to inmates taking anything bought from the machines out
of the visiting hall or the security of the machines, the installation
of the machines will be considered permanent and no extra of-
ficers will be required in the visiting hall.
8. Should the presence of the machines create security or staffing
problems at the institution, the vending machines may be removed.
9. The Superintendent will consult the IAG and CLP before mak-
ing any decision which will require the removal of the machines. 73
This agreement was signed by the president of the Inmate Advisory
Council and the Superintendent of the institution.
B. Meeting the Fears of Administrators
In an attempt to determine the primary factors which would
prompt administrators to object to the unionization of prison in-
mates, the author conducted a survey among the correctional serv-
ices departments of each of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia.7 4 Although the printing deadlines of the Review im-
posed severe time limitations upon the departments, and despite
the tendency of many administrators to discard such question-
naires, responses were received from representatives of twenty-five
states. Many of the responses indicated the careful attention which
a number of states have given to the real problems which attend
any organizational effort. The results of the survey roughly paral-
leled the findings of a 1964 study of attitudes toward inmate
self-government attempts.7 5 Most administrators do not favor in-
mate labor unions because they fear abuses of inmate power,
intensified problems of control and security, the difficulty of "bar-
gaining" with poorly adjusted, socially deviant inmates, and the
effect of bargaining on the continuing existence of penal institu-
tions.
The tragedy of the use of the "trusty" guard in the Arkansas
73. Report, supra note 71, app. A(1).
74. For an analysis of the survey results, see Survey supra note 13.
75. See Baker, Inmate Self-Government, 55 J. Caim. C.L. & P.S. 39 (1964).
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correctional system 76 has led many administrators to fear the
granting of power to inmates. Many believe that abuses are an in-
evitable consequence of any such grant. "The strongarm inmate
or the cutie is likely to become a leader in this type of activity
[inmate self-government] and enforce the wishes of a few on the
many." 77 Other commentators point out, however, that
[i]nmate leadership is present in all prisons .... The constructive
use of inmate leadership is an obvious way to avoid riots. Some
type of inmate self-government that involves honest and well su-
pervised elections of inmate representatives to discuss problems,
make recommendations and perhaps, even take some responsibil-
ities from the administration could be helpful . . . [I]t is in the
interest of the administration to know the inmates' thinking and
their action. In any case, downward communication is not
enough.7S
The Center for Correctional Justice has sought to avoid the prob-
lem of the powerful inmate by selecting representatives on a re-
volving basis. Selection of union representatives might follow
this same pattern.
Another problem feared by administrators is that of control.
Many correctional officers believe that the organization of inmates
into a unit would make control within the institution difficult or
impossible. In the words of one administrator:
About 40 years ago there was [a self-government group] . . . and
it did not work out well .... I understand that as time went on
76. For a brief description of the horrors of the Arkansas Penal System and the use of
the "trusty" or inmate guard, see Note, 23 ALA. L. Rxv. 143, 144 (1970). Assaults, fights,
stabbings, homosexual attacks, etc. resulted from the use of these guards.
77. This was a response received from an administrator in reply to a survey question-
naire asking about the value of inmate council groups. The results of the survey are found
in Baker, supra note 75, at 43. The majority of the responses were not in favor of inmate
councils. However,
[i]t is interesting to note that of 44 responding institutions only 13 report experi-
ence with inmate self-government or advisory council groups. Six respondents who
have never had direct experience with such groups expressed a negative view, based
usually on the negative experience of others.
Id. at 45.
See also Survey, supra note 13. One administrator noted that "placing power in the
hands of strong individuals is not in the best interest of institutions."
78. Fox, supra note 1, at 13. See also Survey, supra note 13. A number of the Survey
responses stressed the need for formal and informal communication.
79. See Statement of Linda R. Singer, Executive Director, Center for Correctional
Justice Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 92 Cong., 2d
Sess., Nov. 11, 1971, at 8 [hereinafter cited as Statement to the House Committee on the
Judiciary].
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it became involved in the administration of the institution. We
found it was most unsuccessful. 80
Another administrator cited an instance where the security of the
institution was threatened.
Many years ago, probably 25 or 30, the Inmate Council used their
privilege to meet in the evening within a cell block to plan and
execute an escape attempt. One of the guards was severely beaten.
That episode ended the Council.81
The Center for Correctional Justice has minimized control prob-
lems by gradually increasing the role of the inmates and, at the
same time, making it clear to inmates that greater responsibility
and additional privileges are inseparably tied."2 Other commen-
tators believe that control problems are minimal if inmates feel
that they have a vested interest in the maintenance of order.8 3 A
union could provide the needed interest because, by its nature, it
is oriented toward the resolution of the pressing employment
problems which pervade institutional life. Inmate Councils have
traditionally been directed toward "intra-mural interest programs
such as recreation and entertainment." 84 One administrator noted
that "[t]he group has no authority and its suggestions are ac-
cepted as nothing more. . . ,, " Councils adopted under these
circumstances cannot create sufficient enthusiasm or interest to be
effective channels of inmate grievances and frustrations. In the ab-
sence of such channels disorder and dissension are inevitable. 0
80. See Baker, supra note 75, at 45.
81. Id. See also Survey, supra note 13, where the fear for personal safety is evidenced
by the statement of an administrator.
82. Statement to the House Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 77.
83. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 1, at 13-14.
84. See Baker, supra note 75, at 45.
85. Id. at 44.
86. See Bass, supra note 4, at 125: "[I]nsurrections [are] the ultimate tactical resource
available to inmates who want to force change." In the absence of other tools, disorder and
insurrection are the only method for effecting change. See W. GELLHORN, W HEN AMEIUCNS
COMPLAIN 150 (1966). Professor Gellhorn notes that
riots and "strikes" in state prisons, where they occur far more frequently than in
similar federal institutions, may reflect the inadequacy of the available grievance
mechanisms; they seem chiefly designed to draw outside attention to inside prob-
lems.
But see Baker, supra note 75, at 44, where a prison administrator described the cause and
consequence of the demise of the inmate council:
Through the years there have been many rehabilitative programs that have placed
more control in the inmate's hands and each one of these programs have proved
disastrous .... One of these rehabilitative programs caused the riot (in 1952).
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The geheral labor movement expeiienced a marked decline in
militancy and a concurrent increase in discipline and "business-
like" conduct as employer acceptance of and cooperation- with
labor organizations became more widespread.8 7 A good faith bar-
gaining effort by prison administrators, which gives recognition
and responsibility to inmates, and which is characterized by the
acceptance of and cooperation with inmate representatives, may
very well lead to a similar reduction of tension and hostility.
Many administrators do not feel that inmates are capable of
determining their destinies within the correctional institution.
"When a prisoner is adjusted enough to advise how to run the
prison he doesn't belong here. He should be released." I8 This
may be true with respect to some inmates, but current experiments
such as that of the Center for Correctional Justice lead the observer
to discount the general application of this proposition. Inmates
have shown themselves to be capable of assuming responsible roles
in assisting with the administration of the institution. A lesson to
be learned from the conduct of inmates during the 1971 Attica
disruption warns against dismissing or ignoring their intelligence
and competence in formulating and negotiating various proposals
for change."9 Other institutions have witnessed a similar accept-
ance of responsible attitudes by inmates in tense confrontation sit-
uations.90
One final consideration should be mentioned. Some adminis-
trators may believe that the unionization of inmates would make
life "inside" too much like life on the "outside." Administrators
who support collective bargaining between inmates and authori-
ties believe that such bargaining will provide inmates with fair
It is going on nine years now that we have the place under control. Custody is in
first place . . . before you can teach you have to have attention. We have had no
trouble during this period.
87. See R. LEsTER, supra note 45.
88. Baker, supra note 75, at 44. At least one commentator believes that prisoners "are
poorly equipped by nature or training to participate in rational planning for themselves or
their companions." See W. GELLHORN, supra note 86, at 145. See also Survey, supra note 13;
some administrators believe that unions are counterproductive to rehabilitation, and that
good administration rather than "bargaining" is the key to dealing with the poorly adjusted
inmate.
89. For a description of the "bargaining" which occurred within the Attica facility, see
TIME, Sept. 20, 1971, at 12-14; TiaIE, Sept. 27, 1971, at 18-31.
90. See, e.g. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1971, at 1, col. 2, for a brief description of the
"negotiation" which occurred during the recent disruption at the Rahaway State Prison,
Princeton, New Jersey. The dispute ended peacefully after a negotiated settlement between
the goyernor of New Jersey and the inmates.
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wages, and that such wages will bring about an end to prisons as
we know them." Prisons will more closely resemble modern in-
dustrial society. Although certain administrators would welcome
this result,92 others could be expected to oppose. Unionization
would not be compatible with the punitive orientation which is a
major characteristic of the present correctional system. 3 The
"management" of the inmates by direction and discipline would
become more and more difficult as they gained additional rights.
However, "[i]t is widely agreed among penologists that . . . the
purpose of prison is rehabilitation." 11 It is just as widely agreed
that this purpose has not been realized.9 5 If unionization would
enhance the likelihood of successful rehabilitation, and thereby
further the general purpose of the prison, it would seem that each
institution should be willing to implement such a program, de-
spite the resultant increase in the managerial burden.
III. UNIONIZATIONAs A REHABILITATIvE TOOL
As was alluded to earlier, inmate councils are believed by
some administrators to be counterproductive to the rehabilitative
goal. 6 If this is true, the explanation may lie in the "advisory"
nature of councils and in the corresponding powerlessness of their
members. 97 By contrast, an inmate union which offers true power
to inmates but which is designed to eliminate many of the abuses
91. See Report of the National Conference on Prisoners' Rights, University of Chicago
Continuing Education Center, Nov. 7, 1971, at 25, for comments by John Boone, Superin-
tendent of the Lorton Complex in Virginia. For comments by David Fogel, Commissioner
of the Minnesota Department of Corrections, see Id.
92. See id.
93. See Johnson, A Basic Error: Dealing With Inmates As Though They Were Ab-
normal, 35 FsD. PROB. 39, 43 (Mar. 1971), for a description of the punitive nature of the
present system. See also Survey, supra note 13. One administrator noted that "we must not
forget the victim of the crime. The primary purpose of prison is the lockup."
94. Singer, supra note 8, at 387.
95. See, e.g. Jaffee & Reed, Jamming the Revolving Door, 33 Fmn. PRoa. 32 (Dec. 1969):
The AGE-OLD problem in rehabilitation has always been the dilemma of the re-
volving door. The adolescent enters the institution, serves his time, is paroled, and
then almost inevitably is rearrested and returned to the institution to serve more
time....
Modem investigations show that the inmate often leaves without a marketable
skill, with low reading and math level, and returns to his former environment
angrier at the world and himself than he was before his incarceration. His ex-
istence becomes one cycle after another through the revolving door.
Id.
96. See text accompanying supra notes 77, 80 & 81.
97. See text accompanying supra note 85.
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found in inmate-operated institutions, 8 could be a useful tool for
the genuine rehabilitation of inmates.9 9 "True power" should not
be defined so broadly as to enable inmates to preempt adminis-
trators in the exercise of their duty to maintain order and security
within the institution, nor so narrowly as to prevent inmates from
assuming a meaningful role in the formulation of work-related pol-
icies and programs. The scope of the bargaining should be as
broad as practicable, and the bargaining should be structured so
as to assure that within the designated bargaining area adminis-
trators do not have the unreviewable power to unilaterally veto
the good faith proposals of the inmate representatives.
The unionization envisioned by this comment involves col-
lective bargaining between elected inmate representatives and ad-
ministrative representatives. 100 Negotiation would be the most
desirable method of conflict resolution, but if it proved ineffective
mediation or arbitration might be selected. "Lawsuits should be
brought where there is no alternative." 101 Inmates would not
have the right to strike: hopefully disputes could be resolved
through negotiation or mediation, and arbitration would finally
resolve remaining disputes. Limitations as to the size, time, and
location of meetings and the "revolving" representation of the
union might be instituted as required by the necessities of prison
life. The area of permissable bargaining should be as broad as
practicable. This would be in keeping with the belief that the
right to unionize exists for inmates and should be curtailed only
to the extent necessary to maintain order and security within the
institution. 02
98. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Ark 1970), dealing in part with abuses
of power granted to inmate guards.
99. See generally Lopez-Rey, supra note 4, for an in-depth analysis of the prospects
for and consequences of the integration of prison labor into the general work force.
100. With increasing frequency, various authorities are coming to recognize the wide-
spread applicability of collective bargaining to the resolution of various disputes. See gen-
erally Kheel, supra note 72. The utility of this extrajudicial system has long been recognized
in the area of labor relations, and recently collective bargaining has proven to be a highly
successful method of dealing with civil rights, campus unrest and other community conflict
situations. Id. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1972, at I, col. 7, which indicates that a griev-
ance committee has been elected at New York's Attica Correctional Facility. The committee
will meet with prison administrators to discuss various institutional problems.
101. Report of the National Conference of Prisoners Rights, supra note 91, at 23.
This statement was made by John Palmer, a member of the Ohio study group on Cor-
rections.
102. See text accompanying supra notes 10-50.
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A union could prove to be rehabilitative in a number of ways.
Leadership qualities among inmates would be developed; partici-
pation by the institutional population in this legitimate grievance
structure would encourage and stimulate in the inmates those
qualities of citizen involvement which they would encounter upon
their release from the institution; together with administrative and
legislative reform, the bargaining activities within the institution
would have the potential to remove many of the dehumanizing,
deplorable conditions which have been allowed to persist within
many institutions-thus making the facilities more conducive to
rehabilitation; the opportunity to become involved in meaningful
employment within and upon release from the institution would
be enhanced by the bargaining objectives and by the possible in-
volvement of the prison unions with national or international
unions; 103 and the ability to negotiate for a fair wage would en-
able the inmate to assist his dependents and/or to save a sum of
money which would increase the likelihood of his successful entry
into the general society upon his release. 10 4
CONCLUSION
If prisoners have a constitutionally protected right to engage
in some form of labor unionization, it is important that this right
be safeguarded and that its exercise be allowed to the fullest extent
possible. In the absence of a "constitutional right," it might never-
theless be desirable to allow the formation of such organizations.
Clearly something is wrong with the nature, operation and conse-
quence of our correctional system. The method of dealing with in-
mates is largely responsible for this condition. To "keep the lid
on" or to "keep the situation cool" many administrators have
adopted a policy which stresses containment, restriction and disci-
pline. The inmate has been forced to tolerate this policy at "what-
ever price to his humanity and prospects for a normal future
life," 105 and the general society has suffered upon the return of
103. For a discussion of labor's position with respect to the employment of offenders,
see Perlis, Labor's Position on the Employment of Offenders, 6 NPPA J. 138 (1960). It might
be expected that labor which feels threatened by prison workers would not be enthusiastic
about this "competition." See Lopez-Rey, supra note 4, at 19. But if prison industry followed
the state use plan, the friction from outside should be minimal. See Rodli, Revolution in
Prison Industries, 6 NPPA J. 146, 151 (1960).
104. See Lopez-Rey, supra note 4, at 18.
105. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d. Cir. 1971).
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the "angry and resentful" 106 inmate to the outside population.
No one doubts the difficulty of the task which corrections offi-
cials must regularly face. Security is the primary goal in the maxi-
mum security institution, and to insure its adequacy stringent
and sometimes severe practices are necessary. °7 Yet
the man under detention continues to be a man. He is not free,
but neither is he without rights. The question to be considered is
how the prisoner's residual rights can best be protected without
destroying a penal institution's discipline. 08
Recent developments have indicated that "bargaining" between in-
mates and administrators can be an effective way of dealing with
many institutional problems and of relieving some of the tension
and frustration which build to intolerable levels in such institu-
tions. 0 9 When combined with the experiences of the general la-
bor force, which has witnessed a general decline in militancy as
employer acceptance of and cooperation with labor unions has in-
creased," 0 these developments indicate that one of the many forms
of labor organization could be an effective means of safeguarding
many of the rights of inmates and of providing a realistic alterna-
tive to litigation or insurrection.
PAUL R. COMEAU
106. Id.
107. See Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 429-30 (D. Md. 1966).
108. W. GELLHoRN, supra note 86, at 145-46.
109. See text accompanying supra notes 66-73.
110. SeeR. LasTER, supra note 45.

